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Pierce: Employment Law

EMPLOYMENT LAW
I. COURT REAFFIRMS AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE

In Epps v. Clarendon County' the South Carolina Supreme Court
reaffirmed the general rule that employment situations of an indefinite
duration are terminable at will.2 The court declined to extend the
exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine beyond those previously
recognized in South Carolina.3
The plaintiff, Epps, had been an employee of the Clarendon County
Department of Public Works for approximately seven years. The
Director of the Department originally hired Epps in 1980 as an at-will
employee. In 1987, the newly appointed Director of the Department laid
off Epps as part of a county-wide budget cut. Thereafter, Epps filed suit
against the county for breach of contract and for wrongful discharge. The
trial court granted the county's motion for summary judgment, and Epps
appealed. 4
Epps argued on appeal that the trial court improperly granted
summary judgment because the Clarendon County Personnel Policy
Manual created an implied employment contract.5 Although Epps
received an employee handbook during his employment, the court noted
that the handbook contained no provision that altered his at-will
employment status. 6 Therefore, the court concluded that Epps's
termination was not a breach of contract.7
The court also dismissed Epps's claim for wrongful discharge. Epps
alleged that he was fired because of his political association with his
former boss. 8 However, the court concluded that this claim did not
involve a right to employment.9 While the Epps court did not address
the validity of this claim, the court refused to extend the public policy
exception of Ludwick to situations in which "the employee has an
existing remedy for a discharge which allegedly violates rights other than

1. 304 S.C. 424, 405 S.E.2d 386 (1991) (per curiam).
2. Id. at 425-26, 405 S.E.2d at 386-87.
3. Id. at 426, 405 S.E.2d at 387.
4. Id. at 425, 405 S.E.2d at 386.
5. Id. See text accompanying infra notes 16-17 for a discussion of Small v.
Springs Industries, 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452 (1987) (finding employment

contract from employee manual).
6. Epps, 304 S.C. at 426, 405 S.E.2d at 386-87.

7. Id. at 426, 405 S.E.2d at 387.
8. Id.

9. Id.
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the right to the employment itself."" ° Accordingly, the court ruled that
Epps was an at-will employee subject to termination without cause. "
The South Carolina Supreme Court first adopted the at-will
employment doctrine in'Shealy v. Fowler.2 According to the Shealy
court, "a contract for permanent employment, so long as it is satisfactorily performed, which is not supported by any consideration other than
the obligation of service to be performed on the one hand and wages to
be paid on the other, is terminable at the pleasure of either party."13
Although this rule continues to control employment of an indefinite
duration in South Carolina, this state recognizes two exceptions to the atwill doctrine. In Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina,Inc. 4 the supreme
court recognized an exception to the general rule when the discharge
"constitutes [a] violation of a clear mandate' of public policy." 5
Additionally, in Small v. Springs Industries16 the supreme court held that
a jury may consider whether the terms of an employee handbook alter an
7
employee's at-will employment status.'
Generally, courts have recognized three exceptions to the at-will
employment doctrine: the implied-contract exception, the public policy
exception, and the good-faith-and-fair-dealing exception. 8 The South
Carolina Supreme Court recognized the first two exceptions in Small and
Ludwick, respectively.' 9 Three states have adopted the third exception by

10. Id. The court noted that a civil cause of action exists under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1988), when a government official infringes upon an individual's rights to free
speech and, association. Epps, 304 S.C. at 426, 405 S.E.2d at 387. However, the
court could have easily dismissed this claim as being outside the scope of the public
policy exception. See Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 337
S.E.2d 213 (1985).
11. Epps, 304 S.C. at 426, 405 S.E.2d at 387.
12. 182 S.C. 81, 188 S.E. 499 (1936).

13. Id. at 87, 188 S.E. at 502.
14. 287 S.C. 219, 337 S.E.2d 213 (1985).
15. Id. at 225, 337 S.E.2d at 216. The Ludwick court followed the trend of other
jurisdictions in adopting a public policy exception. See, e.g., Frampton v. Central
Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind. 1973); Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., 416
S.E.2d 166, 173 (N.C. 1992).
16. 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452 (1987).

17. Id. at 486, 357 S.E.2d at 455.
18. See generally Note, Protecting Employees at Will Against Wrongful
Discharge:The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1935-37 (1983).

19. For a discussion of Small, see supra text accompanying notes 16-17. For a
discussion of Ludwick, see supra text accompanying notes 14-15. A majority of
jurisdictions also recognize these two exceptions. See generally Michael A.
DiSabatino, Annotation, Modern Status ofRule thatEmployer May DischargeAt-Will
Employee for Any Reason, 12 A.L.R.4TH 544 (1982); Theresa L. Kruk, Annotation,
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss1/9
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implying a duty of good faith and fair dealing in all employment
relationships.2" However, South Carolina has not adopted this minority
position. Skepticism about the good-faith exception is warranted because
this exception, if adopted, could severely restrict the right of an employer
to terminate an employee without cause. In fact, dissatisfaction with the
good-faith exception is evidenced by New Hampshire's narrow construction of the exception 2' and the California Supreme Court's disapproval
of that state's good-faith-and-fair-dealing exception.'
The Epps decision, based upon the court's prior holdings, is both
predictable and well-reasoned. The primary importance of this opinion
is the court's reaffirmation of the general at-will employment doctrine as
modified by the implied contract?' and public policy exceptions. 4
Although the court was quick to reaffirm its loyalty to the at-will
doctrine, the court failed to define the doctrine's limits. Specifically, the
court failed to state whether claims alleging a violation of rights other
than the right to employment fall within the public policy exception. The
court refused to broaden the public policy exception under the facts of
Epps, but the court left open the possibility of extending the exception
in a similar case without an alternative remedy.
B. Dean Pierce

Right to Discharge Allegedly "At-Will" Employee as Affected by Employer's
Promulgation of Employment Policies as to Discharge, 33 A.L.R.4TH 120 (1984)
(discussing implied-contract exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine).
20. E.g., Cleary v. American Airlines Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Ct. App. 1980),
disapproved of in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) (en
banc); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977);
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
21. See Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 436 A.2d 1140, 1143 (N.H.
1981) (stating explicitly New Hampshire's retreat from the good-faith exception);
Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 414 A.2d 1273, 1274 (N.H. 1980) (limiting Monge to
discharges involving infractions of public policy or actions encouraged by public
policy).
22. See Foley, 765 P.2d at 401 n.42.
23. See Small v. Springs Indus., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452 (1987).
24. See Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 337 S.E.2d
213 (1985).
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